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Abstract
I discuss reasons why manufacturing productivity statistics should be interpreted with caution in
light of the recent growth of domestic and foreign outsourcing and offshoring. First, outsourcing
and offshoring are poorly measured in U.S. statistics, and poor measurement may impart a
significant bias to manufacturing and, where offshoring is involved, aggregate productivity
statistics. Second, companies often outsource or offshore work to take advantage of cheap
(relative to their output) labor, and such cost savings are counted as productivity gains, even in
multifactor productivity calculations. This fact has potentially important implications for the
interpretation of productivity statistics. Whether, for instance, productivity growth derives from
a better-educated, more efficient U.S. workforce, from investment in capital equipment in U.S.
establishments, or from the use of cheap foreign labor affects how productivity gains are
distributed among workers and firms in the short term and undoubtedly matters for U.S.
industrial competitiveness and living standards in the long term. Although it is impossible to
fully assess the impact that mismeasurement and cost savings from outsourcing and offshoring
have had on measured productivity growth in manufacturing, I point to several pieces of
evidence that suggest it is significant, and I argue that these issues warrant serious attention.

I am grateful to Katharine Abraham, Mike Harper, Peter Meyer, Anne Polivka, Ken Ryder, Larry
Summers, Lisa Usher, Robert Yuskavage, and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank–
Chicago for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to Mary Streitweisser and James
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Employment in U.S. manufacturing began declining steadily in the late 1990s, and the
decline accelerated dramatically after 2000. Manufacturing employment was 19 percent lower in
2005 than in 1998, even though manufacturing output was 10 percent higher. One bright spot
for U.S. manufacturing has been its extraordinary growth in productivity. The rate of
productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing increased in the mid-1990s, greatly outpacing that in
the services sector and accounting for most of the overall productivity growth in the U.S.
economy. In a comparison with 14 other industrialized or newly industrialized countries,
manufacturing productivity growth in the United States over the last decade was greater than that
in all but two countries (BLS 2006, Table B). These strong productivity statistics have been
taken to imply that what remains of U.S. manufacturing is highly competitive in international
markets and provides a solid basis for improvement of American workers’ living standards.
The drop in manufacturing employment coincided with an increase in outsourcing to
domestic contractors, including staffing services, and an increase in outsourcing of materials and
services inputs to foreign companies or affiliates, commonly known as offshoring. Outsourcing
and offshoring might plausibly result in higher productivity. For instance, companies might use
staffing agencies to more closely match worker use with actual production needs (Abraham
1990; Ono and Sullivan 2006) or outsource noncore functions to domestic or foreign contractors
with greater expertise in these areas (Erickcek, Houseman, and Kalleberg 2003). Mann (2003)
notes that the offshoring of much of the production in the IT sector resulted in lower prices of
high tech equipment, which, she argues, stimulated the diffusion of high-tech equipment and the
gains in productivity in the U.S. economy. Amiti and Wei (2004, 2006) also report evidence of a
strong link between services offshoring and manufacturing productivity growth.
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However, the coincidence of U.S. productivity growth with the growth of outsourcing
and offshoring has also raised concerns that strong productivity growth since the mid-1990s,
particularly in manufacturing, is misleading and its implications misinterpreted. Most analysis
focuses on labor productivity measures, which in U.S. manufacturing are defined as constant
dollar shipments divided by hours worked by manufacturing employees. When manufacturers
outsource or offshore work, labor productivity increases directly because the outsourced or
offshored labor used to produce the product is no longer employed in the manufacturing sector
and hence is not counted in the denominator of the labor productivity equation. A 2004 study by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) sought to allay concerns that the accelerated growth in
manufacturing labor productivity was being driven in a mechanical way by outsourcing and
offshoring. It found that the contribution to manufacturing productivity growth from purchased
services and materials-input purchases, which include domestic outsourcing and materials and
services offshoring, actually declined over the 1990s. The study thus concluded that outsourcing
and offshoring could account for none of the acceleration of productivity growth witnessed in the
latter half of the decade (BLS 2004).
In this paper I raise questions about the conclusion of that study. I argue that even
multifactor productivity measures, which were used in the BLS study and are designed to
account for all inputs, should be interpreted with caution for two fundamental reasons. First,
measurement of outsourcing and offshoring in U.S. statistics is poor. I present evidence that
existing statistics greatly understate outsourcing by U.S. manufacturers to temporary help and
related staffing agencies and thus may have missed much of manufacturers’ extensive
outsourcing to this sector in recent years. Recent government reports have raised similar
concerns that data understate offshoring activities of U.S. companies because of the difficulty of
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accurately measuring the prices and quantities of imported inputs (GAO 2004; National
Academy of Public Administration 2006).
Second, besides greatly complicating the measurement of inputs needed to compute
productivity statistics, outsourcing and offshoring may significantly alter what is counted as a
productivity gain. Companies often are motivated to outsource to domestic and foreign
contractors or affiliates in order to exploit cheap (relative to their output) labor. Although such
cost savings do not accord with common perceptions of what constitutes productivity
improvements, they are recorded as productivity gains in multifactor productivity calculations.
Such cost savings likely are increasingly being captured in productivity statistics, and, with the
growth of materials and services offshoring, affect not just sector but also aggregate productivity
statistics.
Yet, this source of productivity growth and its implications are rarely noted in the
productivity literature.1 The implications for who benefits from measured productivity growth
are obvious and potentially important. While any cost savings from outsourcing and offshoring
are counted as productivity gains, outsourcing and offshoring simultaneously place downward
pressure on manufacturing workers’ wages. Understanding the source of productivity gains is
also important for understanding the implications of manufacturing productivity statistics for that
sector as well as for the aggregate economy. Whether productivity growth derives, for instance,
from better-educated U.S. workers working more efficiently, from U.S. companies investing in
high-tech capital in U.S. establishments, or from U.S. companies offshoring materials and
services inputs to exploit cheap foreign labor no doubt matters for the long-term competitiveness
1

Slaughter (2002) links productivity growth in the high-tech sector to the growth of global production networks and
notes the low cost of foreign labor as one source of productivity gains. He does not develop the implications of this
point, however. I am unaware of other work discussing labor cost savings from materials and services offshoring as
a source of measured productivity growth.
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of the U.S. economy and living standards of American workers, albeit in ways that currently are
poorly understood.
Although it is impossible to determine the extent to which mismeasurement of inputs and
these types of labor cost savings from outsourcing and offshoring have contributed to the recent
growth of measured manufacturing productivity, I point to several pieces of evidence indicating
that these factors are significant: 1) apparent understatement of the contribution of
manufacturers’ outsourcing to the staffing sector in previous productivity statistics (Dey,
Houseman, and Polivka 2006); 2) findings that services offshoring, which is likely to be
significantly underestimated and associated with significant labor cost savings, accounts for a
surprisingly large share of recent manufacturing multifactor productivity growth (Amiti and Wei
2006); and 3) the small high-tech sector, which pioneered the development of global production
networks and outsourced much of the work performed domestically, accounted for about a third
of multifactor productivity growth in the U.S. economy in the late 1990s. Together, this
evidence makes a prima facie case that mismeasurement and labor cost savings from outsourcing
and offshoring have significantly influenced measured manufacturing and, in the case of
offshoring, aggregate productivity growth. These issues, I argue, warrant further study.

THE CONCEPT OF PRODUCTIVITY AND ITS MEASUREMENT
Productivity may increase because of an improvement in workers’ efficiency: workers
can produce more output with any given amount of other inputs. Reduction of slack time
through more efficient assignment of workers to tasks is one example of how productivity may
increase through this channel. Productivity may also increase because of technological
improvements, typically embodied in capital equipment, which allow for the production of more
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output with any given amount of labor and other inputs. The rapid development of computer
technology and associated automation, for instance, is widely believed to have fueled
productivity growth in developed economies in recent years. Both sources of productivity
growth accord with popular conceptions of what productivity improvements capture.
Although the broad concept of productivity is easy to understand, measuring productivity
in a sector or in the aggregate economy is complex. Two types of productivity statistics are
computed: labor productivity and multifactor productivity. Below, I discuss how these two
productivity measures are constructed for the U.S. manufacturing sector.

Measurement of Labor Productivity in U.S. Manufacturing
Most analysis focuses on labor productivity, which in U.S. manufacturing is computed as

Qt Lt
÷ ,
Q0 L0

(1)

where Qt is the index of output in the current period (current period output divided by output in
Q0

the base period) and

Lt
is the index of labor in the current period (current period labor input
L0

divided by labor input in the base period). Output in the manufacturing sector is measured as the
value of shipments, in constant dollars, from manufacturing establishments adjusted for
inventory change and net of intra-industry shipments—i.e., shipments from one manufacturing
establishment to another.2 Labor input is measured as the simple sum of hours worked by
employees of manufacturing establishments. The growth in labor productivity across periods,
is computed as
2

The output measure for U.S. manufacturing productivity statistics does not net out purchased material and
services inputs, and thus it differs from the value-added concept of output used in the construction of U.S. aggregate
business-sector labor productivity statistics. In the treatment of outsourced and offshored material and services
inputs, the labor productivity measures for the aggregate economy are more analogous to the multifactor productivity
measures discussed below.
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(2)

⎛ P ⎞
⎛ Q ⎞
⎛ L ⎞
ln ⎜ t ⎟ = ln ⎜ t ⎟ − ln ⎜ t ⎟ .
⎝ Pt −1 ⎠
⎝ Qt −1 ⎠
⎝ Lt −1 ⎠

Thus, the percent change in productivity over time equals the percent change in output less the
percent change in labor input, measured by hours worked.3
This simple measure of labor productivity has well-recognized limitations that make it
difficult to interpret. Increases in measured labor productivity may reflect the ability of workers
to produce more with given amounts of other inputs, or they may reflect technological
improvements—both of which accord with common conceptions of what drives labor
productivity growth. Alternatively, increases in measured labor productivity may simply reflect
the substitution of other inputs for labor. Of particular relevance to this paper, the outsourcing of
labor to domestic contractors such as temporary help agencies or to foreign companies or
affiliates will be measured as labor productivity gains rather than as the substitution of
manufacturing labor for labor located in a different sector or in a different country.

Multifactor Productivity Measures (KLEMS)
Multifactor productivity measures are designed to address this shortcoming of labor
productivity measures. KLEMS—which stands for capital (K), labor (L), energy (E), materials
(M), and purchased business services (S)—is the multifactor productivity measure developed for
U.S. manufacturing.4 KLEMS measures of U.S. manufacturing productivity have been
computed on an annual basis for the 1987-to-2004 time period. Conceptually, KLEMS measures

3

Taking the natural logarithm of a ratio approximates the percent difference of the numerator from the
denominator.
4
The methodology used for computing multifactor productivity for the private business sector is somewhat
different than that used for manufacturing. For a discussion of the methods and sources used in computing various
multifactor productivity statistics, see BLS (1997).
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not the change in labor productivity per se, but rather the change in productivity to all inputs
used in the production process collectively. KLEMS is computed as
(3)

⎛ A ⎞
⎛ Q ⎞ ⎡ ⎛ K ⎞
⎛ L ⎞
⎛ IP ⎞ ⎤
ln ⎜ t ⎟ = ln ⎜ t ⎟ − ⎢ wk ⎜ ln t ⎟ + wl ⎜ ln t ⎟ + wip ⎜ ln t ⎟ ⎥ ,
⎝ At −1 ⎠
⎝ Qt −1 ⎠ ⎢⎣ ⎝ K t −1 ⎠
⎝ Lt −1 ⎠
⎝ IPt −1 ⎠ ⎥⎦

⎛ A ⎞
where ln ⎜ t ⎟ denotes the change in multifactor productivity. As with the manufacturing
⎝ At −1 ⎠
labor productivity measures, output in KLEMS, Q, is constant-dollar shipments net of inventory

change and intraindustry shipments, and L is the summation of labor hours. The measure of
capital input is based on the flow of services from capital equipment, structures, land, and
inventories. Intermediate purchases (IP), which include material and energy inputs and
purchased business services, are generally measured as current dollar values deflated by
appropriate prices. To compute multifactor productivity, the various inputs—or in this case log
changes to the inputs—must be aggregated in some way: labor hours must be aggregated with
purchased material inputs (such as kilowatt hours of energy consumed), purchased business
services, and so forth. The weights used in the multifactor productivity calculations—wk, wl, and
wip—are computed as the average share of production costs in adjoining periods t and t−1. Thus,
the percent change in multifactor productivity simply equals the percent change in output less a
weighted average of the percent change in all inputs, where the weights represent the average
factor shares in the two periods.
While the use of factor cost shares is an intuitively plausible way to weight the percent
changes of separate categories of inputs, under certain stringent assumptions such an aggregation
has a theoretical justification. These assumptions, taken from a simple general equilibrium
model, include the supposition that all factors are paid their value marginal products—that is, the
wage or payment made to an input factor reflects the value of output that an additional unit of the
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input would generate. As I argue below, however, productivity statistics capture a dynamic
adjustment process for which such a simple general-equilibrium theoretical framework is likely
to be particularly inapplicable and, where there is widespread substitution between input
categories, complicate the interpretation of productivity statistics.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OUTSOURCING POSES FOR MULTIFACTOR
PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

Significant increases in outsourcing to domestic contractors or in offshoring parts of the
production process to foreign companies or affiliates raise at least two concerns about
multifactor productivity statistics in manufacturing. One is purely a measurement issue. The
second is a more fundamental methodological issue concerning precisely what the productivity
index measures.
Measurement Issues
Manufacturers that outsource functions reduce their own labor and capital inputs and
increase purchased inputs. The accuracy of multifactor productivity measures requires that
changes in purchased inputs be fully captured in the data. In the case of domestic and
international outsourcing, however, these purchased inputs are not well measured. Collection of
detailed data on inputs used by industries is difficult and expensive, and thus statistical agencies
historically have focused their greatest resources on accurately measuring inputs deemed most
important, like energy usage. Although the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) generates
input-output tables that provide a comprehensive set of estimates of commodity use for all
industries, these estimates are only as good as the underlying survey data, which often are thin.
The crudeness of certain input estimates would not matter for productivity calculations as long as
little substitution to or from these inputs is occurring. However, the growth of domestic and
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foreign outsourcing has raised concerns that inaccurate measurement of these inputs results in
inaccurate measurement of productivity growth in various sectors and, particularly where there is
foreign outsourcing, inaccurate measurement of productivity growth for the aggregate economy.
Here I present direct evidence that an important component of domestic outsourcing by
manufacturers—the use of employment services, composed primarily of temporary help and
leased employees—has been greatly underestimated in the statistics that generate KLEMS
measures, potentially leading to an overstatement of productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing.
In addition, I review reasons why government statistics likely understate offshoring and thus
overstate productivity estimates for sectors and the aggregate economy.
In constructing KLEMS productivity statistics, BLS bases its estimates of employment
services input to manufacturing on benchmark input-output (I-O) tables constructed by the BEA
every five years; the most recently available benchmark tables are for 1997.5 In the 1997
benchmark I-O tables, the estimate of manufacturers’ use of employment services was not based
on direct evidence, but rather was imputed from data collected in the Business Expenses Survey
(BES), which is administered to companies in the wholesale, retail, and services sectors.
Companies completing the survey were asked to report their expenditures on contract labor,
defined as “persons who are not on your payroll but are supplied through a contract with another
company to perform specific jobs (e.g., temporary help, leased employees).” It was assumed that
companies answering this question reported expenditures on six types of contract services—
temporary help services, employee leasing services, security guards and patrol services, office
administrative services, facility support services, and nonresidential building cleaning services—
and thus these services were treated as a bundled commodity. Data on industry output in each of
5

BLS estimates annual I-O tables from these five-year benchmarks. The 2002 benchmark I-O tables will
be available in 2007.
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these contract labor services industries came from the Economic Census and were aggregated to
match the level of (assumed) commodity aggregation in the BES. The residual of the contractlabor services not accounted for by industries surveyed in the BES was imputed to industries not
surveyed in the BES based on their output shares. To generate I-O estimates at a more
disaggregated commodity level, it was assumed that industries utilized all contract labor services
in the same proportion. For instance, if an industry was estimated to use 10 percent of all
contract labor services, it was assumed to use 10 percent of each of the component contract
services.
While such an imputation would result in imprecise estimates of manufacturers’
expenditures on employment services, these estimates also may be biased for several reasons.
Because evidence shows that manufacturers are disproportionately heavy users of staffing
services, the assumption that industries not surveyed in the BES utilize all contract labor services
in proportion to their output will result in an underestimate of staffing services for
manufacturing. In addition, the BES data only provide information on expenditures. Output
prices are estimated from input prices in user industries, which tend to overstate prices,
understate quantities of inputs purchased, and hence overstate multifactor productivity growth
(BLS 1996). Moreover, contract labor is not clearly defined in the BES and arguably could
include a larger set of contract work than assumed in the construction of the BEA I-O tables. If
this is the case, estimates of all contract labor services utilized by manufacturers would be
systematically understated.
Available information indicates substantial bias in the imputation of the employment
services input to manufacturing. Estimates from the five Contingent Worker Supplements to the
Current Population Survey (CPS) show that 35–40 percent of temporary help agency workers

10

were assigned to manufacturing in the 1995–2005 period; Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2006)
estimate that 27–33 percent of employment services workers were assigned to manufacturers
over the 1989–2004 period. These figures contrast with the much lower estimates that only about
15 percent and 5 percent of employment services output was assigned as an input to the
manufacturing sector in the 1992 and 1997 benchmark I-O tables, respectively. The large
decline in the fraction of employment services output imputed to manufacturing is particularly
striking given evidence that manufacturers greatly increased their utilization of these services
during that period (Segal and Sullivan 1997; Dey, Houseman, and Polivka 2006).
Government data used to estimate offshoring activities come from several sources. U.S.
trade statistics furnish detailed information on the importation of material goods, which BEA
imputes to end users in its I-O tables. The BEA conducts benchmark and annual surveys of
cross-border trade in services with unaffiliated foreigners. A separate BEA survey collects
information on cross-border trade with affiliated foreigners. Reporting of service transactions
with unaffiliated foreigners is only required if the transaction exceeds $1 million or with
affiliated services if the affiliate’s assets, sales, or net income exceed $30 million, raising
concerns that services offshoring is significantly understated (GAO 2004). Additional
information about potential offshoring activities can be gleaned from data collected by the BEA
on U.S. multinational companies, which report foreign direct investments and information on
outsourced intermediate goods and services from domestic and foreign sources combined.
Recent reports by the GAO (2004) and the National Academy of Public Administration (2006)
have described gaps in data collection, benchmarking that occurs infrequently, and the lack of
accurate price data with which to estimate the quantity of imported services. These and other
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factors detailed in the reports may contribute to unreliability and underestimates of goods and
services offshoring.

Methodological Issues

Pick something to move offshore today . . . [In India you can get]
quality work at 50 to 60% of the cost. That’s two heads for the price
of one.
―Microsoft senior vice-president Brian Valentine, quoted in Lazonick (forthcoming)

The second concern with the productivity estimates is more fundamental and relates to
the construction of these numbers and what counts as a productivity gain. As noted above, the
multifactor productivity calculation in Equation (3) can be derived from a simple general
equilibrium model. For the multifactor productivity numbers generated from Equation (3) to
have a clean theoretical interpretation, the assumptions of this general equilibrium model must
hold, including the assumption that all factors are paid their marginal product and hence that
differences in factor prices solely reflect differences in factor productivity.6 Although such
simplifying assumptions are perhaps necessary to construct a tractable model for the purposes of
estimating aggregate productivity statistics, such a general equilibrium model arguably is illsuited for capturing the dynamic adjustment process that intrinsically underlies productivity
changes. The model’s assumptions are not innocuous.
As the above quotation illustrates, an important reason manufacturers outsource or
offshore work is to save on labor costs. Because of technical innovations, removal of barriers to
trade, or some other market change, it may become profitable for companies to engage in factor

6

The assumption that factors are paid their value marginal product, in turn, derives from assumptions that
product, labor, and other input markets are perfectly competitive, that inputs are substitutable in the production
process, and hence that these marginal values are observable. The model also assumes that the production process is
characterized by constant returns to scale.
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price arbitrage, exploiting differences in the cost of hiring labor across sectors within the country
or across countries. A unionized company or a company with historically high labor costs may
utilize a staffing agency to lower wages, benefits, workers’ compensation, and other nonwage
labor costs. This strategy is exemplified in recent agreements between the Ford Motor Company
and its employees’ union, the United Auto Workers, to utilize staffing agency workers at its
plants to handle low-skilled work (McCracken 2007). Staffing agency workers earn a fraction of
the wages and benefits of direct-hire unionized employees. The documented growth in imported
material inputs and the offshoring of services is widely attributed to the lower costs of skilled
and unskilled foreign labor and to technological changes and the removal of trade barriers, which
allow companies to exploit these lower labor costs. If, for instance, a company substitutes
lower-cost, but equally productive, contract (foreign or domestic) labor for its own employees,
output per worker hour will not have changed from the company’s perspective, but cost savings
from the shift to contract labor will be counted as a net reduction in inputs used and thus a
productivity gain (Equation [3]). This occurs because contract labor is treated as a separate input
(IP) from employees hired directly by the company (L), and when the company substitutes
contract for direct-hire labor, the increase in the cost share of contract labor (wip) does not match
the reduction in the cost share of direct-hire labor (wl).7
In practice, a company may lower costs by shifting to less productive but substantially
lower-cost contract labor, and from the company’s perspective output per worker hour would
fall, but measured productivity in Equation (3) would rise. Such a case is nicely illustrated in a
recent report by McKinsey & Company (2006), which compares the research and development

7

Although this article pertains to manufacturing productivity, it is also the case that pure labor cost savings from
offshoring are likewise measured as productivity gains in the value-added concept of labor productivity and in
multifactor productivity measures for the aggregate economy.
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costs that Cisco Systems, (the world’s leading producer of networking equipment) incurs by
developing switching routers through its own U.S.-based engineers with the costs incurred by
outsourcing the research and development to a Chinese company, Huawei Net Engine.
According to McKinsey & Company’s estimates, the amount of work hours required by
Huawei’s engineers to develop the product is roughly double that required by Cisco engineers,
but because labor costs of Chinese engineers are dramatically lower than those of American
engineers, McKinsey estimates that the cost of R&D in China is about one-fifth that in the
United States. If Cisco outsourced the R&D to China and actual work hours were measured as
labor input, labor and multifactor productivity would fall. However, because Chinese contract
labor is treated as a separate input and weighted by its cost share, multifactor productivity
measures increase.
Institutional barriers or other types of adjustment costs typically would preclude the
profit-maximizing firm from instantaneously shifting all of a particular type of labor input from
direct-hire employees to lower-cost contract labor, even if this was the profit-maximizing
outcome in the end. What we observe in practice is the shift in staffing patterns over time away
from direct-hire employees toward contract labor. Note that even if one assumes, as is consistent
with neoclassical economic assumptions, that the cost of using contract labor, including
adjustment costs, equals its value marginal product for the “marginal” or last hired worker at
each point in time, the shift in staffing patterns presumably would result in some cost savings to
the firm; formally, the firm would realize labor cost savings on the “inframarginal” contract
labor that it hires. And in Equation (3) such cost savings will be counted as a productivity gain
because, in aggregating across inputs, direct-hire labor and contract labor are weighted by their
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cost shares, and the decline in the cost share of the former will exceed the rise in the cost share
of the latter.
Should such cost savings be counted as productivity gains? As such gains are
traditionally defined in manufacturing productivity statistics, the answer is probably no.
Currently, the measurement of labor input in productivity statistics somewhat artificially depends
on the legal status of the employment relationship. As noted above, a company could save
money by outsourcing labor but use more labor hours to produce the same output. Particularly
in the case of foreign outsourcing, however, one might argue that such cost savings represent a
net gain in resources for the company, the sector, or the aggregate economy. For instance, the
ability to exploit cheap (relative to workers’ hourly output) foreign labor might be seen as a
productivity gain that results from technical innovations that reduce transportation and
communication costs, although imperfections in product and input markets and the transfer of
technology and know-how resulting from trade may erode net gains to the economy as a whole.8
Even if it is desirable to measure outsourced labor as labor rather than as a separate
intermediate input in productivity statistics, as a practical matter it would be difficult and in
some cases impossible to do so. These different input categories must be aggregated, and the use
of cost shares is a straightforward, intuitively plausible way to do so. It should be recognized,
however, that current productivity measures include savings that result purely from lower hourly
costs of outsourced labor, and that this fact has potentially important implications for the
8

For instance, if workers who are displaced by offshoring experience significant unemployment spells or
other costs in finding new jobs, and if those costs are not taken into account by companies in their decision to
offshore tasks, the net gain to the American economy from offshoring would be less than the gain realized by the
companies engaged in offshoring. Samuelson (2004) argues that over time free trade can result in a deterioration in
a country’s terms of trade and hence lower its welfare if the trade promotes technological and productivity gains
among the country’s trading partners. This type of logic is commonly used to argue that developed countries will
not necessarily benefit from the globalization of production if such trade promotes skill development and
technological progress in countries such as India and China. For a discussion of worker dislocation costs and a
rebuttal to Samuelson’s argument, see OECD (2006).
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interpretation of measured productivity gains and how these gains are distributed among workers
and capital.

THE EFFECTS OF OUTSOURCING ON PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT IN
MANUFACTURING: SOME SUGGESTIVE EVIDENCE

As is evident from the above discussion, the growth in outsourcing or offshoring likely
will lead to an increase in measured productivity in manufacturing, even in the KLEMS
multifactor productivity measures. Poor measurement of domestic and foreign outsourcing may
result in systematic understatement of the amount of outsourcing that occurs in aggregate or in
the manufacturing sector. Moreover, the use of factor cost shares to weight the growth of factor
inputs implies that unless differences in factor payments solely reflect differences in the value
added by these factors of production, an assumption that is particularly unrealistic in the case of
domestic and foreign outsourcing, cost savings that result purely from the lower prices of
outsourced labor will be counted as productivity gains. This fact has potentially important
implications for the interpretation of productivity statistics. These effects on measured
productivity would be of little concern if they were empirically small. Although I have no
definitive information on the size of the effects, I present evidence that suggests they are
significant and warrant serious attention.
The Contribution of Staffing Services Outsourcing to Manufacturing Productivity

The first piece of evidence pertains to the effect of manufacturing’s outsourcing to
employment services on manufacturing productivity estimates. Matthew Dey, Anne Polivka,
and I have constructed annual estimates of workers from staffing agencies (the employment
services industry) that were assigned to manufacturers from 1989 to 2004, using data from the
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Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program, the Current Employment Statistics (CES)
program, and the Contingent Worker Supplements to the CPS (Dey, Houseman, and Polivka
2006). We estimate that the number of workers in the employment services sector grew from
419,000 in 1989 to a peak of more than 1.4 million in 2000. In relative terms, employment
services workers added an estimated 2.3 percent to manufacturing employment in 1989 and an
estimated 8.2 percent in 2000. From 2000 to 2001 employment services bore a disproportionate
share of the employment reductions in manufacturing. Following 2001, staffing services
assigned to manufacturing expanded while employment in manufacturing continued to decline
sharply. As a result, we estimate that by 2004 employment services added 8.7 percent to
manufacturing employment, although the number of employment services workers in
manufacturing was still below its peak level of 2000. In other words, our estimates indicate that
staffing services workers make up a significant and growing share of the dwindling number of
manufacturing jobs remaining in the United States. These figures imply that it is important to
accurately account for outsourcing to the staffing sector when computing multifactor
productivity for manufacturing.
Using employment in manufacturing with and without adjustments for outsourcing to
employment services, I estimate the contribution of this type of outsourcing to labor productivity
in manufacturing. Specifically, I reestimate Equation (2) using employment estimates that
include workers in employment services assigned to manufacturing as follows:
(4)

⎛ Qt ⎞
⎛ AdjLt ⎞
⎛ Pt ⎞
⎟⎟ − ln ⎜⎜
⎟⎟ .
ln ⎜
⎟ = ln ⎜⎜
⎝ Pt − 1 ⎠
⎝ Qt − 1 ⎠
⎝ AdjLt − 1 ⎠
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The difference in the rate of growth in measured labor productivity from Equation (2) and the
rate of growth in the adjusted measure of labor productivity from Equation (4) shows the
contribution of employment services outsourcing to productivity growth in manufacturing.
A couple of features of these estimates should be noted. First, because the OES data we
use to generate estimates report number of workers, not hours worked, the labor productivity
measures I compute pertain to output per worker, not output per hour, which is the more
common labor productivity measure. Particularly over the time horizons that I am examining,
changes in output per worker and output per hour in manufacturing are very similar. In addition,
data from the CPS Contingent Worker Supplements indicate that the average number of weekly
hours worked in the preceding week by temporary agency workers assigned to manufacturing is
only slightly below the average number of weekly hours worked by direct-hire manufacturing
workers in comparable occupations. Three occupations—production workers, laborers and
helpers, and office and administrative workers—account for 75–80 percent of all staffing agency
workers assigned to manufacturing. Within each of these occupations, temporary agency
workers assigned to manufacturing worked an average of 8 percent fewer hours weekly than
direct hires in manufacturing did. In some estimates reported below, I take into account
differences in hours worked when computing adjusted labor productivity figures.9

9

Specifically, I multiply the number of workers in a particular occupation assigned to manufacturing by the
ratio of hours worked by temporary agency workers and direct-hire employees in a particular occupation category.
For instance, if temporary agency production workers’ hours were on average 0.92 that of direct-hire production
workers’ hours, I count each staffing agency production worker assigned to manufacturing as just 0.92 of a worker.
Most of the difference in weekly hours between temporary agency and direct-hire workers employed in the same
occupation probably stems from the fact that temporary agency workers are more likely to begin or terminate a job
during the course of the week in which hours are measured. Because PEO workers are permanently assigned to an
organization, their weekly hours should not differ from those of direct-hire workers, and hence the Table 1 figures
that adjust for hours worked, if anything, probably overstate the importance of differences in hours worked between
staffing agency workers and direct-hire employees in productivity calculations.
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Second, productivity estimates are computed on fourth quarter, not annual, data to
correspond with the timing of the OES survey.10 Labor productivity growth can be sensitive to
the endpoints used. For instance, because manufacturing was beginning to slow down by the
fourth quarter of 2000, the estimates of labor productivity growth are lower when computed from
fourth quarter 1995 to fourth quarter 2000 than when computed using annual data for the same
years. For this reason, I report estimates over varying time periods to check the sensitivity of the
findings to the endpoints used.
The three columns in the top panel of Table 1 display the annual growth rate in labor
productivity (output per worker), the growth rate in labor productivity adjusting for the use of
employment services workers, and the contribution of employment services outsourcing to
manufacturing labor productivity growth. Over the 1990 to 2000 period, outsourcing to
employment services accounted for about a half-percentage point of the growth in the labor
productivity measure, or about 15 percent of that growth. The contribution of employment
services to manufacturing productivity growth was larger during the latter part of the period than
for the early part of the period, and this finding is robust to the endpoints used in the analysis.
Adjusting for lower hours worked per week by staffing agency workers has little impact on the
estimates and does not affect the qualitative nature of the findings. Note that although
accounting for employment services workers generally results in a reduction in estimated
manufacturing labor productivity growth rates, it results in a higher estimated productivity
growth during the 2000–2001 downturn, reflecting the fact that temporary agency workers bore
the brunt of adjustment to the recession.

10

In the past, the OES was conducted each year in November. Since 2002, the OES has been conducted
twice annually, once in March and once in November.
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The bottom panel of Table 1 reproduces figures reported in BLS (2004), which are based
on calculations from KLEMS. The three columns show reported labor productivity growth
(output per hour), productivity growth adjusted for purchased business services, and the
contribution of purchased services to the rate of labor productivity growth. The computations
are based on annual rather than fourth-quarter data, and the definition of productivity is output
per hour rather than output per worker. More important, the KLEMS estimates in the bottom
panel adjust manufacturing labor productivity for all of purchased services, which include not
only employment services but also services purchased from domestic contractors in other sectors
and from offshoring. It is widely believed that during this period manufacturers increasingly
adopted strategies to outsource and offshore, and hence, all else equal, the productivity
adjustments for purchased services from KLEMS in the bottom panel should be greater than the
adjustments based solely on outsourcing to employment services.
The numbers presented in the top and bottom panels of Table 1 portray inconsistent
pictures of the role outsourcing played in manufacturing productivity growth during the 1990s.
The KLEMS estimate of the contribution of all purchased services to productivity growth in the
early 1990s is about the same as the estimated contribution of employment services by itself,
reported in the top panel. More strikingly, in the latter half of the 1990s, the estimated
contribution of purchased services from KLEMS is much lower than the estimated contribution
of employment services alone. In addition, while the estimates in the top panel show a
substantial increase in the contribution of employment services outsourcing to labor productivity
growth in the 1990s, those in the bottom panel show a substantial decline.
The conclusion in BLS (2004)—that outsourcing and offshoring had minor effects on
productivity growth in manufacturing and played no role in the acceleration of manufacturing
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labor productivity during the 1990s—simply is not supported by estimates based on data
generated in Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2006). It appears unlikely that differences in
productivity concepts (output per worker vs. output per hour) and the time periods over which
they are measured explain these inconsistencies. Rather, the low estimates of employment
services output imputed to manufacturing in the BEA I-O tables used to generate the KLEMS
figures suggest that the differences in the measurement of outsourcing are at least partly
responsible for the discrepancies. As noted above, the share of the employment services imputed
to the manufacturing industry was just 15 percent in the 1992 BEA I-O benchmark table, and it
fell even further, to 5 percent, in the 1997 benchmark table. The extraordinarily low estimate of
manufacturers’ use of employment services in the 1997 I-O benchmark—at a time when all other
data pointed to a large increase in manufacturers’ outsourcing to the staffing industry—could
help explain why BLS (2004) found that none of the acceleration in manufacturing labor
productivity was attributable to outsourcing.
Figure 1 displays indices of employment and output in U.S. manufacturing from 1989 to
2004. The growing gap between the employment and output indexes measures the growth in
simple labor productivity, defined as output per worker. A third line depicts manufacturing
employment adjusted to take into account outsourcing to the staffing services sector, as reported
in Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2006). As is evident, outsourcing to staffing services can
explain some of the phenomenal growth in U.S. labor productivity in the manufacturing sector,
but by no means most of it. Other factors that potentially explain the remaining gap include
technological improvements including automation, outsourcing to other domestic contractors,
and offshoring of services and production of intermediate inputs. The remainder of the paper
focuses on the potential contribution of the last category.
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Evidence on the Contribution of Services Offshoring to Multifactor Productivity Growth:
Real or Mismeasurement?

A recent study by Amiti and Wei (2006) found a strong association between offshoring
of services and productivity growth. Amiti and Wei concluded that services offshoring
accounted for 11–13 percent of the growth in manufacturing labor productivity from 1992 to
2000. They used a value-added concept of labor productivity that, in theory, netted out increased
material and services inputs from offshoring on the labor productivity measure.
Although this study has data shortcomings acknowledged by the authors, the larger point
is that in spite of the relatively low levels of services offshoring, the authors’ estimates of
imported services in manufacturing industries are strongly correlated with industry productivity
growth. Offshoring genuinely may lead to some increased productivity among American
workers through the channels suggested by the authors. One channel is through compositional
effects in which production remaining in the United States focuses on tasks in which U.S.
workers are more efficient. Another occurs through the importation of services that make
American workers more efficient. But the surprisingly large estimated effects of services
offshoring on manufacturing productivity raise concerns that measurement problems underlie the
paper’s findings. Because data understate the amount of services offshoring taking place with
U.S. businesses and because recent expansion of services offshoring is motivated to a large
degree by the lower wages of foreign labor, the large amount of manufacturing productivity
growth that the authors attribute to services offshoring may, in part, be from picking up error in
the measurement of manufacturing productivity and pure labor cost savings, not from the
increased efficiency per se of American workers.
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High Productivity Growth and Extensive Outsourcing and Offshoring in High-Tech
Industries

“The personal computer on your desk today may have been
designed in Taiwan and assembled in Mexico, with memory
chips from South Korea, a motherboard from China, and a
hard drive from Thailand.” (Agrawal, Farrell, and Remes
2003)
Of special concern is evidence that productivity growth in the 1990s was concentrated in
the high-tech sector, a sector that pioneered outsourcing and offshoring practices. From 1990 to
2000, output per labor hour increased by 45 percent for all of manufacturing, while this simple
labor productivity measure increased by 426 percent in computer and electronic product
manufacturing. Moreover, labor productivity growth in the semiconductor and computer
manufacturing industries far outpaced that in the rest of the computer and electronic product
manufacturing sector. From 1990 to 2000, labor productivity increased by 961 percent in
semiconductors and by an astounding 1,495 percent in computers. Since 2000, labor
productivity in these two industries has continued to soar (Figure 2).
Multifactor productivity measures, which should net out increased inputs from
outsourcing and offshoring, show a similar picture, with measured multifactor productivity
growth in computer and electronic manufacturing dwarfing growth in manufacturing as a whole
(Figure 3). Reflecting these facts, Oliner and Sichel (2000) show that much of aggregate labor
productivity growth was attributable not only to the adoption of high-tech capital, which
embodies the technological advances of computers and semiconductors, but also to productivity
growth in the industries that produce computers and semiconductors. Oliner and Sichel estimate
that production of computers and semiconductors accounted for 58 percent of multifactor
productivity growth from 1991 to 1995, for 56 percent of multifactor productivity growth from
1996 to 1999, and for about 36 percent of the acceleration in the productivity growth between
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the early 1990s and the late 1990s.11 Oliner and Sichel note that these percentages are
extraordinary given the tiny share of current dollar output computers and semiconductors
account for in the aggregate economy.
Schweitzer and Zaman (2006), justifying the concentration of productivity growth in
these two industries, write that “advances in chip technology are widely acknowledged as having
driven the dramatic productivity gains in the semiconductor sector and, in turn, the computer
equipment sector.” However, others have questioned whether the productivity gains in the
production of high-tech equipment—as distinct from productivity gains that result from the use
of computer and other high-tech equipment in other sectors—are exaggerated. Various factors
could contribute to the high productivity numbers in high-tech industries. For example, the
difficulty of accurately measuring output and prices in industries characterized by such rapid
technological progress in the product produced has been much discussed and could result in
substantial mismeasurement.12 Here, I focus on the possible contributions of outsourcing and
offshoring to the high productivity estimates in the IT sector.
Several case studies have documented the innovations in business strategy that originated
in the IT sector, including the offshoring of the manufacturing process, the offshoring of
services, and the extensive use of temporary help staffing and other contract workers for much of
the work that remained in the United States (Ernst and O’Connor 1992; Hyde 2003; Lazonick
forthcoming). Much of the actual manufacturing of computer equipment had been offshored by

11

Similarly, according to BLS estimates, two manufacturing industries, Industrial and Commercial
Machinery (SIC 35) and Electronic Machinery (SIC 36), accounted for 71 percent and 69 percent of multifactor
productivity growth over the 1990–1995 and 1995–2000 periods, respectively, and almost half of the acceleration of
productivity growth between the two periods. These estimates are from an unpublished BLS document dated
October 21, 2004. Under the old SIC classification system, computer equipment manufacturers were grouped in SIC
35 and semiconductor equipment manufacturing was coded in SIC 36; now both form part of NAICS 334.
12
See, for example, Aizorbe (2005); Aizcorbe, Oliner, and Sichel (2006); Basu et al. (2005); and Feenstra
et al. (2005).

24

the early 1990s to developing countries in order to access cheap labor (Ernst and O’Connor
1992). Slaughter (2002) more generally discusses the growth of global production networks in
high-tech industries. He presents evidence of the increase in the shares of inputs that were
imported in various industries through the mid-1990s, though the import data distinguishing
input from final goods production are limited. Several WTO agreements that reduced trade
barriers in the high-tech sector and that coincided with the acceleration of productivity growth in
that sector in the latter half of the 1990s should, if anything, have further stimulated global
production networks.13 In addition, employment remaining in this country was heavily
outsourced to staffing agencies, other contract workers, and independent contractors (Hyde
2003). More recently, the high-tech sector took the lead in the offshoring of high-skilled jobs in
order to access inexpensive skilled labor in developing countries, a development made possible
by innovations in communications, in particular the Internet (Lazonick forthcoming).
During the 1990s output in the computer and electronic product manufacturing sector
soared while measured labor hours in the sector remained flat. Since 2000, output has been flat,
while labor hours have declined sharply. Little can be assessed from these figures about actual
productivity growth, however, because so much of the labor input is not employed in this sector,
but rather in other domestic industries and in foreign companies or affiliates. An accurate count
of this labor and purchased materials input is critical to an accurate assessment of the sector’s
productivity growth. Yet, as detailed above, because measurement of outsourcing and offshoring
is poor in U.S. statistics, it is possible that multifactor productivity growth in high-tech industries
is significantly overstated. In addition, to the extent that expansion of the production of IT
13

Slaughter (2002) provides a good discussion of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO Information Technology Agreement, and the WTO Basic
Telecommunications Agreement. He makes a strong case that offshoring is in large part responsible for productivity
gains in the U.S. IT sector. Slaughter mentions the role that lower foreign labor costs may have played in increasing
measured productivity but does not develop the implications of this point.
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equipment was occurring disproportionately in low-wage countries, cost savings or “gains from
trade” from offshoring would be counted as productivity gains.14 The fact that domestic prices
were adjusted to reflect improvements in the quality of IT products, but import prices of
intermediate IT inputs were not, further exacerbates the problem. Although any distortions from
outsourcing and offshoring on productivity measurement in high-tech industries may have had
little effect on the measurement of aggregate productivity growth, special investigation of this
issue should be undertaken, particularly given this sector’s role in driving recent productivity
growth in the U.S. economy.

WHY UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF OUTSOURCING AND OFFSHORING
ON MANUFACTURING PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IS IMPORTANT

The manufacturing sector has accounted for much of the high productivity growth in the
U.S. economy in the last decade. In addition, manufacturing, more than any other sector, is
subject to pressures from international competition, and productivity growth is an important
indicator of its global competitiveness. Accurately measuring and interpreting productivity in
this key sector is arguably important in and of itself.
Any biases to manufacturing productivity statistics introduced by domestic outsourcing,
however, likely will net out in aggregate productivity statistics: labor hours not counted in
manufacturing will be counted in services and the two will cancel each other out (BLS 2004).15

14

Feenstra, et al. (2006) also point to the extensive offshoring of the production of IT equipment as a
possible culprit for the implausibly large productivity gains in the industry. They suggest that product price indexes
used in the computation of productivity statistics are not adjusted quickly enough to account for exchange rate
changes, and hence, gains from trade due to exchange rate changes may be counted as productivity gains. They find
relatively little empirical support for their hypothesis, however.
15
In a different twist on this theme, ten Raa and Wolff (2001) argue that manufacturing productivity growth
may reflect the outsourcing of services, in which productivity growth is slower, and thus that the acceleration of
productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing is simply an accounting phenomenon.
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By implication, to the extent that economists and policymakers are focused on aggregate rather
than on sector productivity figures, domestic outsourcing is not of major concern.16
Any overstatement of manufacturing productivity growth resulting from underestimates
of offshored materials and services inputs clearly will not wash out in aggregate statistics.
Moreover, companies are moving production and service jobs offshore in large part to exploit
cheap (relative to their output) skilled and unskilled labor. In as much as lower hourly foreign
labor costs are not matched by lower productivity, cost savings from offshoring will be counted
as productivity gains. To the extent that offshoring is an important source of measured
productivity growth in the economy, productivity statistics will, in part, be capturing cost
savings or gains to trade but not improvements in the output of American labor and should be
interpreted with caution.
While economic theory holds that improvement in a population’s standard of living is
directly tied to its productivity growth, one of the great puzzles of the American economy in
recent years has been the fact that large productivity gains have not broadly benefited workers in
the form of higher wages (Dew-Becker and Gordon 2005, Yellen 2006). A better understanding
of what our productivity statistics actually measure potentially provides some answers to this
puzzle. Although a number of economists have suggested that offshoring may partly explain
why many Americans have not enjoyed real wage gains during this period of rapid productivity
growth, a contribution of this paper is to suggest a direct link between productivity measurement,
offshoring, and inequality. It is possible that because of poor measurement of imported
intermediate inputs, especially services, productivity measures are inflated. Moreover, even
16

One caveat to this conclusion is that labor input is not treated uniformly in aggregate multifactor
productivity statistics. Rather, labor is treated as 1,008 separate inputs in the production process, with changes in
each weighted according to its cost share. If the distribution of outsourced labor across these labor categories differs
from that of the labor it displaces and if domestic contract labor has lower wages that are not fully matched by lower
productivity, then domestic outsourcing by manufacturers will also inflate aggregate productivity statistics.
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when offshored materials and services inputs are accurately measured, productivity
improvements that result from offshoring may largely measure cost savings, not improvements
to output per hour worked by American labor. Productivity trends may be an indicator not of
how productive American workers are compared to foreign workers, but rather of how costuncompetitive many are vis-à-vis foreign labor. Although the productivity numbers may capture
some net gains to the American economy from trade, there is no reason to believe that these
gains will be broadly shared among workers. The very process of offshoring to cheap foreign
labor places downward pressure on many domestic workers’ wages and simultaneously increases
measured productivity through cost savings.
The potential implications of this source of measured productivity gain are not purely
distributional, however. Undoubtedly it matters for the long-term performance of the U.S.
economy whether productivity improvements arise from smarter, more efficient American
workers, from investment in capital equipment, or from the use of cheap foreign labor. While
more accurate productivity statistics should be sought through improved measurement of
imported materials and services inputs, research should also seek to measure the contribution of
various factors—including pure cost savings from offshoring—to measured productivity gains.
By so doing it can provide the basis for a better understanding of the relationship between
productivity growth and economic performance at the sector and aggregate levels.
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Table 1: Comparison of Manufacturing Labor Productivity Growth Adjusted for Staffing
Services to KLEMS Computations, 1990–2001
Adjustments for employment servicesa
Labor productivity
Contribution of
Annual growth rate of
adjusted for
employment
Time period
labor productivity
employment services
services
1990–2000
3.71
3.17
0.55
1990–1995
1990–1995, adj. for hoursb
1989–1995

3.96
3.96
3.72

3.48
3.52
3.30

0.48
0.44
0.42

1995–2000
1995–2000, adj. for hoursb
1995–1999

3.52
3.52
4.07

2.90
2.95
3.37

0.61
0.57
0.70

2000–2001

2.14

3.33

−1.19

Adjustments for all purchased services, based on KLEMSc

Time period
1990–1995

Labor productivity
Annual growth rate of adjusted for purchased Contribution of
labor productivity
services
purchased services
3.3
2.8
0.5

1995–2000

4.1

3.9

0.2

2000–2001

1.2

1.6

−0.4

a

Calculations are based on output per person, 4th quarter data, and only adjust for Employment Services.
Adjusted labor productivity figures take into account fewer hours worked by Employment Services workers.
c
KLEMS calculations are based on output per person, annual averages, and adjust for all purchased services.
b

Sources: top panel: author’s calculations using data from Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2006); bottom panel: BLS
(2004, Table 1).
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Figure 1: Trends in U.S. Manufacturing Employment and Output
(Indexes, 1992=100)
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Sources: author calculations based on data from Dey, Houseman, and Polivka (2006) and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Figure 2: Labor Productivity, All Manufacturing and Computer and
Electronic Equipment, 1987–2004 (Indexes 1990=100)
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Figure 3: Multifactor Productivity, All Manufacturing Computer and
Electronic Equipment, 1987–2004 (Indexes, 1990 = 100)
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